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The system of public justice is in trouble, perhaps deeper trouble
than that in which the system of justice perennially finds itself. It is
beset by such delay that civil cases on the general docket in many
jurisdictions take more than five years to get to trial.' "Big" civil
cases involve a discovery and pretrial apparatus that makes the legal
process in Bleak House pale in comparison 2 and a trial stage in which,
some observers believe, the issues are untriable, at least by a jury.3
Civil cases generally involve seemingly excessive transaction costs,
both for the parties4 and for the public. 5 Criminal cases are brought
to trial more rapidly under the imperative of the speedy trial re-
quirement. 6 However, this adherence to a nominally efficient sched-
ule on the criminal side is achieved at a high price, often revealed in
the prosecutor's erratic selection of cases for prosecution. Symp-
toms of trouble on the criminal side include a large number of dis-
positions without trial 7 and pervasive plea bargaining.8 Big criminal
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cases become so complex that they, too, max be untriable by ordli-
nary procedure, while ordinary criminal cases are placed on a proce-
dural treadmill that trivializes the ideals of criminal procedure and
the -social purpose of penal sanctions ' Many domains of adimnis-
trative agency adjudication suffer similar ills. The obvious symp-
toms are, again, delay and high transaction costs; the less obvious
indications are erratic patterns of disposition and the dominance of
process over substantive coherence.
When the public system ofjustice no longer functions effectively,
there are powerful incentives to create private systems of justice.'
Private systems ofjustice, which today often are referred to as Alter-
native Dispute Resolution (ADR) procedures, hold a strong attrac-
tion, particularly when compared with a decrepit public court
system.'' Nevertheless, "justice" is an inherently public activity, as
this analysis is designed to demonstrate. Because of the fundamen-
tally public nature of the justice to be administered, a system of pri-
vate justice worthy of the name must substantially replicate
important characteristics of the public system.
I. Prospects for Reform
The deficiencies of the American system ofjustice to some extent
are endemic to any system of administered justice, certainly to one
that seeks to be "neutral" among contending social forces.' 2 All
systems of public justice are vulnerable because they provide "pub-
lic goods"; every potential user would prefer that someone else pay
to keep the system ready for use. This free-rider problem explains
why public services exist in the first place-to make everyone help
pay-and why efforts to improve the system garner little political
support. Unlike many legislative and allocative decisions in which
particular groups stand to gain or lose and consequently lobby for
particular action, reform of the justice system only marginally bene-
fits any particular group. Furthermore, reform may occur whether
9. Margolick, In Search of Efficient Justice: Reforming the Criminal Court. N.Y.
TimesJuly 2, 1983, at Al, col. 2;Jenkins, The Lobster Shift: One Night in the Natin's
Busiest Court. 72 A.B.AJ. 56 (1986).
10. We thank Professor Thomas D. Rowe,Jr. of Duke University l.aw School for the
stimulus provided in his study "Path to a 'Better Way': Litigation. Alternatives, and Ac-
commodation" (ALl Working Paper, Sept. 1987). to be published in 1988 [hereinalter
Rowe Working Paper].
I1. For a general review of the literature on the advantages and disadvantages of
ADR, see Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 lulane
L. Rev. 1 (1987), and citations contained therein.
12. M. Damaska, The Faces ofJustice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach
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or not any particular group provides its political support. Thus no
group has a strong interest in reform, and each is content to wait for
another to take the initiative.
One might expect the legal profession nevertheless to take the
lead in legal reform. Lawyers and judges seem to have the greatest
interest in improving the system of public justice. However, lawyers
often directly benefit from elaborate procedures, and judges are not
supposed to undertake political initiatives. Consequently, it is diffi-
cult to motivate the bar to press for change through the political
process, and any such effort is unlikely to succeed.
The difficulties of developing political support for improving the
system of justice are aggravated by the peculiarities of the public
service that the court system performs. In the most general sense,
the system of administered justice is a public service whose purpose
is maintenance of peace and order in the community.13 The cost of
maintaining this system would be lower if everyone behaved accord-
ing to agreed norms. The administration of justice is a service re-
quired only because there are "bad actors" who impose on others
the externalities of their misconduct.
Until final judgment is reached in a particular case the system has
to respond as though either party to the dispute could be the "good
guy." Yet when the system's work product is viewed in the aggre-
gate, it appears to be an expensive effort for the benefit of people of
whom at least half may be, in some sense, troublemakers. Thus,
considered as a social service, the administration ofjustice is a mor-
ally ambiguous undertaking for which it is especially difficult to de-
velop a political constituency.
With respect to the administration of justice, as with respect to
many other public services, Americans evidently aspire to a higher
standard of service than they are willing to pay for on a sustained
basis. We expect a civil justice system that is expeditious and inex-
pensive, while also permitting high-intensity advocacy on behalf of
the parties, extensive formal and informal pretrial discovery of evi-
dence, elaborate trial procedures including jury trial in many cases,
and appeals of right.' 4 We say we want both technical competence
and democratic participation in conducting the process.' 5 We also
13. Hazard, Rationing Justice, 8J. L. & Econ. 1, 2-3 (1965).
14. F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure, 1-9, 38-44, 223-408 (1985).
15. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 499-502 (1972) (opinion of Marshall, J.) (four-
teenth amendment due process clause forbids a state from subjecting a defendant to
indictment or trial by a jury that has been selected in an arbitrary and discriminatory
manner).
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say we want free access to courts without abuse of process.' 6 On the
criminal side, we seek not only all of these features, but also the
provision of state-compensated counsel for accused persons who
cannot afford representation, 17 who constitute a substantial fraction
of the criminal caseload.
Implementation of these policy aspirations by internal reform in
the court system is a generally unpromising possibility. The policies
must be implemented through a highly decentralized apparatus of
justice mandated by our federalist tradition. We have separate sys-
tems of state and federal courts, separate state and federal
prosecutorial authorities, and separation of the bar from the bench.
The administration of both the state and federal courts systems is
highly decentralized, with the result that judges are law unto them-
selves in a wide range of official functions. If the bar ever had suffi-
cient cohesion to impose standards of competence and forbearance
on its members, it has little such cohesion today.' 8 If the bench and
bar ever had a common interest in maintaining a respectable system,
they tend today to be immured in their separate bureaucracies and
world views.' 9 If there were ever any inclination to impose efficient
administration on the mechanism as a whole, or even within its vari-
ous components, 20 the effort would be doomed to substantial
failure.
The administrative balkanization of the system is complicated fur-
ther by the diffusion of policymaking authority for determining the
goals and procedures that the system is to pursue. Many particulars
of the system are dictated by constitutional provisions, such as those
governing tenure of judges2' and the right of jury trial. 22 These
provisions are virtually impervious to change, even though if recon-
sidered on their merits today they might not be enactable in the
terms in which they were originally cast. Both legislatures and ap-
pellate judiciaries have substantial authority to prescribe goals and
procedures. Moreover, federal and state judicial systems have dif-
ferent supporting constituencies and are governed by different con-
16. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972) (a
pattern of baseless, repetitious claims may constitute an abuse of judicial process strip-
ping defendants of their immunity from antitrust laws).
17. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1965) (right to counsel in a criminal trial is
a fundamental right protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
18. S. Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69
Geo. L.J. 705 (1981).
19. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 Yale L.J. 1442 (1983).
20. See generally Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374 (1982).
21. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
22. U.S. Const. amend. VII.
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stitutional provisions of often conflicting tenor. 2: For example, the
constitutions of some states put judges on a short leash by selecting
them by popular election for short terms, while federal judges hold
life tenure.
Some features of the system of justice are dictated by unrefined
popular sentiment translated into impulsive legislation, such that, in
one decade, legislatures impose compulsory incarceration for sex
offenses, and, in another decade, they do the same thing for drug
offenses. 2' Other features are dictated by incremental budgeting,
which marginally can increase or decrease available resources, but
which ordinarily cannot generate enough financial energy to effect
change in existing bureaucratic routine.2 5 Congress, as the national
legislature, may impose its view of administered justice on the
states, of course, without providing the financial wherewithal to im-
plement its policies.2 ( The federal courts, generally a voice for spe-
cial sensitivity and decency, have set procedural standards for the
states that are beyond the capacity of ihe latter to implement except
on an attenuated or sporadic basis. So the system, particularly the
state judicial system in large cities, is disjointed, underfinanced, and
beset by conflicting policy mandates.
The prospects for change through public, political initiatives also
are not good. Evidently Americans do not care enough about the
defects of the system, for the system is as it has been for at least two
decades-in some cities, even longer. The civil justice system, which
is the primary focus of the present discussion, is inextricably inter-
twined with the criminal system and is likely to stay that way. The
system of administered justice in metropolitan areas today is domi-
nated by the criminal calendar, which in turn is dominated by cases
involving the poor, and more particularly by cases involving the mi-
nority poor. Improving the treatment of poor minorities accused of
crime is not high on the general population's political agenda, nor is
it likely to become so. If there were a move to segregate the civil
justice system from the criminal justice system-with different
judges and different courts-in all likelihood, it would be success-
23. Such differences are reflected in the composition of federal and state courts.
Compare U.S. Const. art. Ill with Cal. Const. art. VI, §§ 15, 16, 18, 20.
24. See, e.g., Bruske, A Law Meets Reality-And Loses, Washington Post, May I1,
1986, at Al, col. 1; O'Neill, Jr., Prison for Child Molesters: the Impact of the 1981
MDSO Repeal and Mandatory Prison Legislation, 7J. Juv. L. 1 (1983); Kohn, Stiff Pen-
alties Upheld for Sale of Narcotics Near Schools, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 8, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
25. See generally A. Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (1984).
26. See, e.g., Stark, Tragic Choices in Special Education: The Effect of Scarce Re-
sources on the Implementation of Pub. L. 94-142, 14 Conn. L. Rev. 477 (1982).
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fully resisted. Hence, the civil justice system is likely to remain hos-
tage to public attitudes toward the administration of criminal justice
and unlikely to be much improved in the foreseeable future.
This state of affairs creates strong incentives to consider other
possibilities for achieving satisfactory civil justice. In understanda-
ble frustration, former Chief Justice Warren Burger has desperately
and repeatedly called for "a better way" to do civil justice.2 7 In-
deed, some ways probably can be found to improve the public svs-
tem of civil justice, and perhaps even the system of criminal justice.
However, the prospects are not strong for reforms that, to a critical
-eye, will be sufficiently great in number, intensive in degree, and
extensive in implementation to make much difference. Even if sub-
stantial minor reforms are accomplished, the average lay observer
will continue to think, along with Chief Justice Burger, that there
must be a better way-a better way to have administered civil justice
that is not so prolonged, expensive, haggle-ridden, often inconclu-
sive, and frequently arbitrary as that which the present public system
produces.
II. Alternative Public Tribunals
One response to the deficiencies of ordinary public justice lies is
the creation of public tribunals of specialized jurisdiction. The con-
ventional interpretation of the emergence of specialized tribunals is
that they respond to new social needs that are putting demands on
the ordinary court system. It is often noted, for example, that the
creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was a re-
sponse to the emergence of the railroads and the need for more
sophisticated tribunals to determine whether rates and service were
"fair." 28 Similarly, the establishment of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) has been described as a response to the organi-
zation of labor in large-scale industry and the need for more
sophisticated tribunals to determine whether the manner in which
collective bargaining was being conducted was fair.2'-
Sometimes the need for a new tribunal is explained not on the
ground that the subject matter in question is too complex, but on
the ground that the issues are simpler than those on the dockets of
27. Quoted in Rowe Working Paper, supra note 10, at 5.
28. See Donelan, A Century of the Interstate Commerce Commission: A Shipper's
Viewpoint, 54 Transp. Prac. J. 151, 151-52 (1987). See also Delisi, Interstate Comnerce
Regulation, 1887-1987: The Carrier Viewpoint, 54 Transp. Prac. J. 262-91 (1987).
29. See A. Ordman, Fifty Years of the NHRA: An Overview, 88 W. Va. . Rev. 15
(1985).
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trial courts of general jurisdiction. Simple cases warrant simplified
justice. This was at least one of the justifications offered for the cre-
ation of the workers' compensation boards and, more recently, the
adjudication machinery provided under the Disability Benefits Pro-
gram of the Social Security Act.30 Either basis for creating special-
ized tribunals can be interpreted as a quest for a "better way"-a
mechanism for dispute resolution "better" than our ordinary courts.
A tribunal is better if it reaches more appropriate outcomes because
its consideration of the issues is more sophisticated or if it reaches
more predictable outcomes because the issues before it are
simplified.
The characteristic that makes either approach better may be de-
scribed as expertise. A specialized tribunal will have greater famili-
arity with the type of case over which the tribunal has jurisdiction. If
the decisionmaker deploys his or her expertise in a suitable way,
then, all other things being equal, the tribunal undoubtedly will
function more expeditiously than a court of general jurisdiction.
Transferring information to the jury is the principal reason that a
jury trial generally takes more time and effort on the part of the
professionals than does a bench trial. The specialized tribunal will
not in each case have to incur the information costs of orienting
itself to the type of case; it already will have that information.
Nonetheless, specialized tribunals may not offer all the benefits
they are thought to provide. Any new tribunal is likely to appear
relatively efficient early in its institutional career. It will have no
backlog to start with, an immediate advantage over the general pub-
lic courts. In addition, the judges of a newly constituted tribunal
will dominate the proceedings and thus produce expeditious out-
comes because the litigants will not yet have learned how to
countermanipulate. Usually, however, the professional representa-
tives of the parties soon will gain influence of their own and inter-
rupt efficient operations with claims for greater procedural fairness.
Unless judicial resources and judicial will are maintained, eventually
the new tribunal is likely to resemble the old ones.
Justification of specialized tribunals on the narrow grounds of
procedural competence is, at best, therefore, only part of the story.
The specialized tribunals that have emerged over the course of his-
tory were not so much necessary as convenient to serve some set of
implicit or explicit political purposes. The railroad rate cases could
30. J. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability Claims 125-
27 (1983).
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have been tried in trial courts; in the early days that is how they were
adjudicated, and even today some railroad cases are adjudicated by
ordinary tribunals. 3' The cases coming before the NLRB could
have been tried in courts of equity, and indeed were so under the
regime disparaged as that of "the labor injunction." 32 The same is
true of the workers' compensation cases33 and, at the level of judi-
cial review, of Social Security disability cases. 34
The most salient of all examples of specialized tribunals created
to meet substantive or political concerns-as opposed to procedural
ones-is the creation of the system of federal courts. 35 The objec-
tives of the Framers in establishing federal jurisdiction in diversity,
admiralty, and matters arising under federal law plainly went be-
yond considerations of procedural efficiency or even "expertise" in
any ordinary sense of the latter term. 6 Diversity jurisdiction ad-
dressed the fear that the state courts could not be counted on to
provide even-handed justice.37 In particular, the Framers were wor-
ried about claims by creditors against debtors-the "haves" against
the "have nots." The primary justification for admiralty jurisdiction
in the federal courts was the need for uniformity in application of
law to maritime commerce.38 A further consideration supporting
aomiralty jurisdiction was the maintenance of a national front in
those legal matters that implicate relationships with foreign powers.
Admiralty jurisdiction, then, was intended not only to further proce-
dural fairness, but also to meet concerns about the substance ofju-
dicial decisions. The justification for federal court jurisdiction in
matters "arising under" federal law was even more directly political
in the fundamental sense of that term. Legislative resolutions under
the Articles of Confederation often had suffered what amounted to
31. Donelan, supra note 28.
32. See generally F. Frankfurter & N. Green, The Labor Injunction (1930).
33. See I Workmen's Compensation §§ 9-10 (W. Schneider ed. 194 1).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 4 05(g)(1982). See also H. McCormick, Social Security Claims &
Procedures § 691 (3d ed. 1983).
35. The federal courts were and are courts of a special jurisdiction carved out of that
jurisdiction which preexisted in the state courts. The contours of federal jurisdiction, in
operation if not in formal authority, have changed over the course of history. Originally,
the principal exercise of federal court jurisdiction was in admiralty and in diversity. To-
day, the principal exercise of jurisdiction is in the supervision of the regime of federal
regulation of economic activity and in the supervision of state and local government
compliance with federal law, including constitutional protections of individuals.
36. J. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 22-28 (1948).
37. See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 87 (5 Cranch)(1809) (Mar-
shall, J.).
38. D. Robertson, Admiralty and Federalism 1 (1970).
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nullification in the hands of the state courts. 39 Protecting federal
policies was a quintessentially substantive, not procedural, concern.
Thus, the quest for different and better tribunals of specialized
jurisdiction is always political to some extent, and often to a very
large extent. A contemporary example of the influence of political
considerations on jurisdictional structure concerns adjudication of
grievances under the federal Fair Housing Act.40 Cases arising
under the Act involving claims of refusal to rent or sell housing on
account of race have been within the jurisdiction of the civil courts;
legislation is now pending that would create specialized administra-
tive tribunals with concurrent jurisdiction of these disputes. 4 1 The
proponents of the legislation believe that such tribunals would offer
"a better way," notably a procedure that would not require jury
trial.4 2 Such a procedure will give a plaintiff (typically black) claim-
ing discrimination a tribunal rather than a jury, which usually has a
white majority.
Once specialized tribunals are created, they may take on charac-
teristics other than those intended. The judges and lawyers will
adapt to substantive and procedural norms that are peculiar to their
tribunal's jurisprudence. They will share an informal lore about
what is right and reasonable, which will be decisive at the margin in
day-to-day dispositions and may indeed have greater influence than
the substantive legal rules and the formal code of procedure that
govern the tribunal. Repeat players of course will be more fully ac-
quainted with the legal culture of a tribunal than will one-shot par-
ticipants. The repeat players' advantage presents a legitimate
source of concern about the tribunal's fairness to outsiders.
Only one step beyond our uneasiness about such effects is a
deeper anxiety about thejustness of tribunals of specialized jurisdic-
tion. The tribunal's expertise may not consist simply of familiarity
with the type of case, or of special technical knowledge necessary to
understand the issues, but also may contain a predisposition toward
39. See F. Frankfurter &J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 8-10 (1927).
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1977).
41. H.R. 1158, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987) (Fair Housing Amendments). See also,
-I.R. 4119, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (Fair Housing Amendments); S. 558, 100th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1987) (Fair Housing Amendments).
42. See Hearing before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
Comm. of the Judiciary of the House of Representatives on H.R. 4119, Fair Housing
Amendments Act, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 41-43, 64-65 (1986) (statements of Peter W.
Rodino, Jr.. Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, and Rep. Hamihon Fish, Jr.). See
also Iangbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823, 826-
31 (1985): I.angbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental Alternative
Fill the American Need?. 1981 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 195.
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certain resolutions of such cases on the merits, at least at the mar-
gin. The problem is not one of plain and crude "packing" of the
tribunal with persons favoring one side in the type of controversy
over which the tribunal has jurisdiction. Of course, there have been
instances when crude packing has been perceived-for example, in
1801, when the Federalists commissioned the "midnight judges" on
the eve of the Federalists' surrender of power in the executive and
legislative branches. However, even when "packing" is not an issue,
those who serve as judges in specialized tribunals-although they
seek to be fair and impartial-will have backgrounds and frames of
reference that tend to predispose them to take one side. Evidence
of such bias frequently is cited in discussions of the politics of ap-
.pointments to such tribunals as the NLRB, the Civil Aeronautics
Board, the Federal Communications Commission, and, at the state
level, the workers' compensation boards and the public utility com-
missions-all of which exercise adjudicative jurisdiction. 43 The se-
lection of judges for the federal bench also results in a subtle
predisposition towards certain types of litigants.
Even persons who have a neutral and disinterested viewpoint
when appointed to a specialized tribunal gradually will develop a
parochial view of the matters coming before them. They will cease
being generalists and no longer retain their former outlooks on the
larger policy implications of their decisions. Some state court
judges argue privately, for example, that federal judges who admin-
ister the fourteenth amendment "live in another world," their deci-
sions no longer reflecting community values. Others have criticized
the NLRB and other specialized tribunals for rendering decisions
that only take account of the parties before them and disregard
broader market implications. 44
Inevitably, whether intended or not, specialized tribunals will pro-
duce results somewhat different from those that would be produced
by the courts of general jurisdiction. As public alternatives to the
general system of adjudication, such tribunals usually are created to
correct perceived deficiencies in the general public courts, and they
can offer more sophisticated and more efficient grievance resolution
with less costly and less complex procedures. But the possibility
also is great that the decisionmakers will bring or develop subtle
43. See. e.g., Gold & Silverman, Reagan NLRB Reveals 'Double Standard' At Work,
Legal Times, Aug. 26, 1985, at 8, col. 1.1,":44. See, e.g., R. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New
Deal Labor Legislation, 92 Yale L.J. 1357, 1403 (1983) (administrative processes under
the National Labor Relations Act should be replaced by traditional common law rules).
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biases and myopic vision. If public tribunals of specialized jurisdic-
tion evoke such criticisms, private tribunals for the administration of
justice raise similar and perhaps more serious concerns.
III. "Private Justice"
Private tribunals come in myriad forms; commercial arbitration is
perhaps the longest-established and most familiar. Modern exam-
ples of commercial arbitration include the system for dispute resolu-
tion among traders on a mercantile or stock exchange and the
practices for resolving disputes under construction contracts and in-
ternational transactions. Another more modern form of arbitration
is the grievance procedure established in collective bargaining,
which typically calls for negotiation and mediation but which
culminates in arbitration. 45 Still another, perhaps less obvious,
form of arbitration is the procedure in auction sales, where the
terms of sale usually give the auctioneer final or nearly final author-
ity to say what is a "bid" and who has made the winning one.
There are still further variations in the contemporary ADR move-
ment, notably those in which the private adjudicative procedure is
"annexed" to the court system. "Annexation" entails a supplemen-
tal or alternative decisional procedure to which the public tribunal
may refer certain types of cases or certain types of issues. Thus, in
civil cases, issues arising in discovery may be consigned to a special
master, issues of liability may be submitted to a "mini-trial," issues
of damages may be referred to an auditor, and various small cases
may be considered in hearings where procedures are streamlined.
The jurisdictional authority exercised in such annexed procedures
derives from the court to which the procedure is connected. Be-
cause the parties are subject to that court's compulsory jurisdiction,
they are more or less coerced to use the procedures when the court
suggests that they do so.
When so annexed, such ADR procedures are essentially stream-
lined instruments of public justice. At the same time, the parties
usually have incentives in addition to that of avoiding the judge's
disappointment or wrath for employing the ADR procedure. These
incentives include reduced court costs, an earlier exploration of the
underlying facts, and an opportunity to formulate and evaluate the
45. Mediation involves a third party that is empowered to suggest terms for resolv-
ing the dispute. Arbitration involves a third party that is empowered to pronounce the
terms of resolution.
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strengths of each party's case. In these respects, the parties to an-
nexed systems of ADR partake of private justice.
Whatever the specific incentive to engage in it, the distinguishing
feature of the private justice system is that participation is in some
sense voluntary. While submission to the jurisdiction of the public
courts is a matter of legal obligation, supported if necessary by the
compulsion of force, submission to private justice depends on con-
sent by both parties. The clearest case of voluntary use of private
adjudication occurs when, after a dispute has arisen, parties submit
to arbitration rather than going to court or relying on negotiation.
A less evidently voluntary case is that of parties for whom the pros-
pect of a dispute was anticipated and provision made in advance that
any subsequently arising dispute would be arbitrated. Here, the
consent to arbitrate is given on the basis of forecast and conjecture
and to that extent is imperfect. Consent is even more attenuated
when an arbitration provision is a term of an adhesion contract gov-
erning a relationship that the party is more or less free to enter; for
example, a person may become a customer on a stock exchange gov-
erned by a standard contract having an arbitration clause or enter
into employment that is governed by a collective bargaining agree-
ment having an arbitration clause. At the furthest distance from the
idea of consent stand the ADR systems annexed to courts, where the
parties' choice to participate in the informal system is an alternative
to a system to which they otherwise must submit. Thus, it seems
accurate to say that while participation in private justice in principle
is voluntary, in various circumstances this voluntariness is not
complete.
IV Can 'Justice" Be Private?
According to a view widely held in contemporary society, volun-
tary arrangements should be left free from state interference. Pri-
vate parties can organize their own businesses, clubs, and
condominiums. Just as private parties are allowed to build their
own roads, so also should they be allowed to provide their own jus-
tice. Such efforts help the state to conserve its scarce resources and
allow independent actors to maximize their utility.. However, in
practice private adjudication entails contradictions that raise doubts
about the concept of private justice itself. This problem can be ex-
plored by considering different dispute resolution procedures in
radically simplified forms.
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There are essentially four types of procedure: (1) unilateral dic-
tate; (2) bilateral negotiated settlement; (3) public justice; and
(4) forms that lie somewhere between bilateral negotiated settle-
ment and public justice. This last category may be described as
"private justice," but there are varying degrees of "privateness" in
such forms, and perhaps corresponding gradations in the "justice"
they afford.
A. Unilateral Dictate
Unilateral dictate is the resolution of a controversy between two
parties in which the stronger party specifies the terms and the
weaker accepts them. The settlement may follow use of force, as in
the "unconditional surrender" imposed by the Allies on Nazi Ger-
many and Japan to conclude World War II, or when the bully in
prison beats a weaker inmate into submission. However, unless the
stronger party simply exterminates the weaker one, the actual use of
force is inadequate to resolve the dispute. Rather, the essential
mechanism in such an arrangement is a threat to use force or some
other kind of coercion.
We consider that unilateral dictate is usually unjust because we do
not often observe unilateral benevolence on the part of a strong
party in a dispute with a weaker one. Instead, we suspect that the
terms of any settlement between parties of widely disparate strength
involves maximization of self-interest by the stronger. However, to
say that such a coerced settlement is per se unjust is to ignore cer-
tain complications. For example, a particular coerced settlement
may be just in terms of its outcome, even though it is the product of
coercion. In any event, in order to say that the settlement is just,
there must be someone to say so.
There are three possible witnesses or evaluators of a settlement
between two disputing parties: either of the two parties themselves
or some outside observer. Were the stronger of the two parties to
say that the settlement is just, a skeptic might reply: "If the settle-
ment is 'just,' why did you have to resort to coercion to get it?"
Were the weaker party to say that the settlement is just, the skeptic
must wonder whether the weaker party's statement also was made
under coercion. If, however, the weaker party is uncoerced when
making an evaluation, there is an independent and reliable basis-
the word of the weaker party-for concluding that the settlement is
just.
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However, "we"-that is, anyone other than the two parties to the
agreement-are likely to remain skeptical. The use of coercion
prior to the settlement provides a sound basis for our suspicion that
the weaker party would not have agreed to the settlement in the
absence of coercion. Moreover, the prior use of coercion suggests
that the weaker party may still be intimidated when making a post-
settlement affirmation. Thus, any assessment "we" might make of
the justness of a settlement cannot rest simply on the evaluations of
the parties to the dispute. An assessment by the parties under the
unilateral dictate scheme as to whether a settlement is just is for-
mally coherent; however, it is implausible-its material truth is sus-
pect. The assessment, to be plausible, must be made by a third
party who has independently observed and assessed the situation.
This test of plausibility suggests that, with regard to a settlement
arrived at where one party has had coercive power over the other,
any intelligible assessment as to whether the settlement is 'just"
presupposes the existence of some third party to make that judg-
ment. "Justice," as a social event, is necessarily a public activity, in
that it requires the presence of someone other than the parties to
the dispute themselves. The third party need not mandate or sug-
gest the terms of the settlement. It is only necessary that the third
party be able to assess the settlement according to some implicit or
explicit standard of his or her own.
B. Bilateral Dictate
The same analysis is used in evaluating the justness of a bilateral
negotiated settlement. In the real world, parties to any negotiated
settlement are subject to at least some coercion by circumstances,
specifically by shortage of the things that are the subject of negotia-
tion. If a buyer or an alleged wrongdoer has an indefinite amount of
money, he or she could offer any amount to pay or buy off the other
party. If a seller or an alleged victim had an endless supply of
goods, he or she would be willing to forego payment for that which
is sold or lost. But no one has infinite resources. Both parties must
give up something to get something, and act under the coercion of
shortage. The possibility therefore exists that the settlement is not
"just."
As in the case of settlement by unilateral dictate, it is possible to
ask each of the parties to a negotiated settlement respectively
whether they consider the terms to be just. Many agreements do
not arouse our concern. Generally speaking, we are willing to ac-
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cept the parties' entrance into the agreement as sufficient evidence
that the terms were just, if not perfectly so. The premise that the
parties in general know reasonably well what they are doing when
they enter an agreement to resolve a dispute derives from the still
broader premise that parties have the ability to enter contracts gen-
erally. The law of contract largely consists of defining the excep-
tions-those circumstances in which a contract did not arise or, if it
did, where its consequences can be avoided. Nevertheless, as with
contract negotiation, there are circumstances in dispute resolu-
tion-such as incapacity of one of the parties (as in the case of mi-
nors), mistake, fraud, or coercion-where we no longer presume
that the parties can take care of themselves.
The impulse to inquire about the justness of a negotiated settle-
ment will be particularly strong when the terms seem one-sided.
Again, the parties can be asked. Again, each of them may say that
the agreement was just. And again, an external observer will not be
fully satisfied. The observer may suspect that the party who got the
worst of the bargain still might be beset by whatever led the party
into the detrimental agreement in the first place-fraud, mistake,
coercion, and so on. Moreover, if one of the parties has complained
that the agreement was unjust, his or her complaint could be sus-
pect. We know that not only stronger parties but also weaker ones
engage in maximization of self-interest. All contracts in the real
world are based on imperfect information and uncertain expecta-
tions, particularly those that go wrong and lead to a dispute.
C. Public Justice
Consideration of these radically simplified cases of unilateral dic-
tate and bilateral settlement illustrates that the presence of a third-
party observer is necessary before any reliable statement can be
made about whether justice has been done. In this minimal sense,
an acceptable statement about justice being done, as distinct from
one that is purely formal, presupposes a three-party community, i.e.,
one person in addition to the parties to the dispute. In principle, it
is sufficient that the third person be an observer; it is not necessary
that the third party be the judge or be authorized to pass on the
terms of the settlement. It is enough that the terms are accessible to
the third party, for then it is possible for a significant statement to
be made as to whether the settlement is just. And by the same to-
Vol. 6:42, 1988
The Public Nature of Private Adjudication
ken, the third party's access to the terms of settlement makes the
matter "public. " 4 6
We can compare this minimally public kind of justice with the
kind rendered in the public courts of general jurisdiction. These
courts renderjustice that is public in many ways. The system is sup-
ported by general tax revenues and its officials are selected by
processes founded on public assent and in which the general public
participates at least indirectly. The courts are available to anyone
with a legal grievance except insofar as jurisdiction has been allo-
cated to some other public tribunal or to arbitration of some kind.
The dispute resolution process-particularly the trial-is conducted
in public view, generally as a matter of constitutional law. Those
who pronounce judgment are public agents speaking ex officio.
Public justice is public in the most obvious sense.
D. Private Justice
If the previous analysis of private justice in Sections A, B, and C
above is correct, then privatejustice is also public. Put differently, all
systems of what meaningfully can be called justice are public to one
degree or another. The difference between public justice and uni-
lateral dictate or bilateral negotiation, insofar as they can be said to
result injustice, is not that one is public and the other not. Rather,.
the difference is the scope and composition of the public that is in a
position to assess the justness of the outcomes. The relevant ques-
tion becomes whether the public environment of a private justice
system is such that the system is subject to assessment in a way sub-
stantially similar to that in which the public system is subject to
assessment.
A system of public justice is, at a minimum, designed to assist in
the orderly maintenance of society according to an implicit set of
values. Among other things, government sanction implies the direct
threat of compulsion by the state. That threat imports a degree of
clarity and forcefulness to the definition ofjustice that is particular-
ized in the judgment. The state's direct involvement also conveys
the message that society is unified against the condemned behavior.
Determinations by a private tribunal lack this governmental impri-
matur and therefore the corresponding social import.
46. For a discussion of the public/private distinction and the qualities that make
something "public," see supra Starr, The Meaning of Privatization, 6 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev.
6, 7-13 (1988).
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Realization of other public norms may be jeopardized by moving
adjudication to a private arena. The advantages of speed and econ-
omy associated with private disposition often are realized at the cost
of reduced solemnity and thoroughness of dispute resolution
processes. To the extent that the private system's inquiry is less
thorough, the private system permits the underlying power of the
stronger party to persist undeflected.
Ironically, the potential damage to public norms from private dis-
positions may be limited because typically private dispositions are
not open to the public. Public law enforcement is necessary to com-
municate legal values and to deter future violations. Decisions
made in secret have diminished normative weight. Of course, all
systems of private justice are subject, under particular circum-
stances, to some sort to appeal to "public justice" for review. How-
ever, appeal in these cases usually is available only on the basis of
fraud or gross mistake. This limitation virtually precludes appeal on
the merits of the controversy, and, even if the outcome is corrected
on appeal, the private tribunal's initial decision may well be the
most memorable to third parties.
Any decision by the state regarding the acceptability of a private
justice system requires balancing the sacrifice of public values that
private justice may entail against the values of individual free choice
and speedier and less expensive dispute resolution. This determi-
nation can reflect a number of considerations. First, the acceptabil-
ity of the private system depends, in part, on the substance of the
underlying claims committed to its jurisdiction. Thus, disputes in-
volving race discrimination in employment invoke values that would
not be implicated in a mercantile dispute.
Second, it is relevant to inquire whether the private system has
been constituted by a representative of a party to the dispute, rather
than by the party itself. When an organization's representatives
agree to private dispute resolution, they may sacrifice the proce-
dural rights of the organization's individual members for gain in
some collateral matter of interest to the organization. Some mem-
bers of the organization might well prefer public justice but will
have no real choice as a result of their obligations to the organiza-
tion. Given that the primary justification for private justice is its
consensual basis, the propriety of such a system necessarily is called
into question when it rests on representative consent. A third fun-
damental consideration is the identity of the third-party partici-
pants-whether the "public" in private dispositions is composed of
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individuals of sufficient objectivity, judgment, and influence to act as
proxies for the general public.
The participation of "repeat players" in this system accentuates
this latter concern. The private nature of private fora might well
incline third-party participants, consciously or not, to cater to those
who may provide repeat business. For example, insurance compa-
nies that are repeat customers in insurance coverage arbitration
might obtain more favorable results than they would receive in a
public court. The opposing parties might not react to such favorit-
ism by withdrawing, since arbitration would still produce significant
cost savings. Further, one-time participants may not have complete
information regarding the disadvantages they face in the private
forum.
However, other factors may offset the repeat player advantage. A
tribunal has leverage to induce repeat players to permit it to act im-
partially. The repeat players must consider the impact on their own
future if the private forum acquires a reputation for partiality. That
reputation will be communicated to influential observers, such as
attorneys and judges, and, eventually, to the general public, which
tends to identify with the one-shot players. These observers are in a
position to disenfranchise an unjust system.
Conclusion
The contrast between resolving claims of right through public jus-
tice and resolving them through private disposition is stark in the
extreme cases. Ordering by public justice means that decisions as
between claims of right are made by an impartial third party. Or-
dering by private disposition may involve a unilateral decision by
the stronger party. Ordering by public justice produces decisions
resting on considerations that transcend the immediate dispute and
the immediate parties. Ordering by private disposition can involve a
normative frame of reference that includes only the immediate
parties.
In the real life of a peaceful and productive community, the ex-
treme cases rarely are directly juxtaposed. The system of public jus-
tice stands as a backup to private ordering conducted through
myriad mediating institutions. Labor-management relationships
have layers of mechanisms for intercession and mediation of work-
place disputes. Relationships between businesses survive conflict
and crisis through the mediatory efforts of the business people di-
rectly involved. Stable neighborhoods have systems of mutual sur-
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veillance and control. Nuclear families hold together partly under
the influence of members of the extended family. Where disputes
over claims of right ripen into legal disputes and resort is made to
lawyers, the lawyers have an interest in their system that usually
dominates the immediate interests of their clients.
Systems of private disposition stand "in the shadow of the law" in
the sense that they are influenced by the public system, are subject
to its intervention, and ultimately must imitate it. If a procedure of
arbitration really is prejudiced, it is subject to invalidation. Because
systems of private disposition are vulnerable to this kind of collat-
eral attack, those who run these systems have to work at making
their outcomes acceptable. One way to make private justice accepta-
ble to the system of public justice is, of course, to have it approxi-
mate the public system's own standards, or to improve on the public
system's performance.
However, not only the shadow but the substance of the public sys-
tem of justice influences systems of private disposition, whether ar-
bitration, mediation, or negotiation. The stronger the public
system, the more intensively it influences the private systems in the
same social community. The weaker the public system, the more
the private systems operate on their own. A system of private justice
becomes fully private only if there is no public system of justice at
all, as in the case of international relations, or if the public system is
so weak and incompetent that it has no influence, as in situations
where law and order has collapsed. But in these situations the me-
dium of private disposition is private coercion and hardly qualifies
as private justice.
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